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America Built The World’s Greatest Wealth Machine. Can It Afford To Keep It Running?

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Table of Contents

America has built one of the most powerful wealth-creation systems in modern history around a distinctive bargain: relatively low taxation, deep capital markets, strong incentives for private ownership and an exceptional capacity to finance public deficits.

The question is whether that bargain can endure in its present form.

The argument that US taxes are too low sounds, at first, like a political proposition. In reality, there are at least four different questions hidden inside it. Are American taxes low compared with other developed economies? Are federal revenues too low to finance the commitments already embedded in law? Are they too low to stabilise the debt burden? Or are they too low because the distribution of wealth and income demands greater redistribution?

Those questions do not have the same answer.

The United States is unquestionably a relatively low-tax advanced economy. General-government tax revenue amounted to 25.6% of GDP in 2024, compared with an OECD average of 34.1%. Yet federal revenues themselves are not extraordinarily depressed by American historical standards. The Congressional Budget Office projected federal revenue at 17.5% of GDP in 2026, slightly above its 50-year average of 17.3%. The deeper problem is that federal expenditure has risen much further, to about 23.3% of GDP in 2026, with spending projected to remain structurally above revenues for years to come.

That distinction matters enormously.

The American fiscal challenge is better understood not as a simple shortage of taxation, but as a collision between a historically familiar revenue base and a substantially more expensive set of public commitments. The consequences extend far beyond Washington. They reach Treasury yields, equity valuations, corporate earnings, private-market financing, currencies, estate planning and the long-term economics of global wealth ownership.

For sophisticated private capital, the relevant question is no longer simply whether tax rates will rise. It is how America ultimately reconciles its low-revenue model with its increasingly high-cost fiscal structure.

Executive Summary

  • US taxation remains significantly below advanced-economy peers, while federal revenues are insufficient to sustain legislated spending commitments.
  • Persistent deficits, rising interest costs and mounting entitlement obligations are challenging long-term fiscal sustainability.
  • Durable fiscal consolidation will require a calibrated combination of revenue reform, expenditure discipline and productivity-led growth.
  • Fiscal imbalances could reshape Treasury yields, sovereign risk premiums, corporate valuations and international capital flows.
  • Tax policy uncertainty, liquidity requirements, jurisdictional complexity and succession planning are becoming increasingly consequential for UHNW families.
  • Enduring wealth demands disciplined governance, fiscal awareness and resilient, globally diversified capital structures.

The Fiscal Paradox of American Exceptionalism

America’s low-tax status is real.

OECD data show total US tax revenue at 25.6% of GDP in 2024. Canada stood at 34.9%, Germany at 38.0%, France at 43.5% and Denmark at 45.2%. The OECD average was 34.1%. The simple difference between the United States and the OECD average was therefore about 8.5 percentage points of GDP.

That is a very large gap.

But it does not follow that America ought to raise taxes by 8.5% of GDP. Different countries finance healthcare, retirement, consumption and local government in different ways. They make different political choices about the size of the state. An OECD average is a comparison, not an economic optimum.

The structure of taxation also differs. The United States relies much more heavily on individual income taxes and property taxes than the average OECD country, while relying much less on broad consumption taxation. In 2023, individual income taxes accounted for roughly 40% of US tax receipts, compared with 23.7% across the OECD. The United States also has no broad federal value-added tax, while VAT contributes about one-fifth of tax revenue across the OECD.

That matters because it limits what international comparisons can tell us about feasible reform.

Closing a European-sized revenue gap exclusively through higher taxes on corporations, capital gains or billionaires would mean asking narrow and relatively behaviour-sensitive tax bases to perform a fiscal function that many European systems distribute across broader consumption taxes and social contributions.

The more revealing American comparison is domestic.

CBO’s February 2026 baseline placed federal revenues at 17.5% of GDP, close to their long-run historical norm. Federal outlays, however, were projected at 23.3% of GDP in 2026 and 24.4% by 2036. The resulting deficit was expected to remain very large even without a recession. Public debt was projected to rise from roughly 101% of GDP in 2026 to 120% by 2036.

So the central fiscal tension is not that Washington suddenly forgot how to collect revenue.

It is that the spending commitments supported by current law have moved well beyond the revenue level that the United States has historically been willing to sustain.

What Does It Mean for US Taxes to Be Too Low?

The phrase “US taxes too low” becomes analytically useful only when the benchmark is specified.

The first benchmark is international. Here the evidence is straightforward: the United States taxes substantially less of its economy than most advanced-country peers.

The second benchmark is fiscal sufficiency. Can current revenues finance current-law obligations without persistent borrowing? Here too the evidence is strong. They cannot.

The third benchmark is debt sustainability. Are revenues sufficient, given spending, growth and interest rates, to stabilise debt relative to the economy? Under current projections, the answer is no.

The fourth benchmark is redistribution. Should wealthy households pay more because the existing distribution of income and wealth is judged inequitable? That is ultimately a normative question. Economics can estimate incentives, revenue, incidence and behavioural responses. It cannot scientifically determine society’s preferred distribution of resources.

This distinction is essential because fiscal arithmetic does not dictate one specific policy response.

A financing gap can be closed by raising revenue. It can also be narrowed through lower spending, slower benefit growth, stronger productivity, broader tax bases, reduced tax expenditures or some combination of all five.

The word “undertaxed” therefore carries an implicit assumption. It assumes that existing spending commitments should substantially remain.

That may ultimately be the political choice. But it is still a choice.

The most defensible formulation is narrower: US federal revenues are structurally insufficient to finance the government Americans have legislated under plausible baseline assumptions.

That conclusion does not tell Washington precisely which tax rates to raise. It does tell investors that maintaining the present combination of low revenue, high expenditure and rising interest costs indefinitely is increasingly difficult.

The Debt Arithmetic Washington Cannot Ignore

The fiscal debate becomes harder once interest is separated from primary spending.

CBO projected a primary deficit, meaning the deficit before net interest, of roughly 2.6% of GDP in 2026. Net interest itself was around 3.3% of GDP and was projected to rise towards 4.6% by 2036.

That distinction changes the nature of the problem.

A growing interest bill represents the cost of financing previous fiscal choices. Unlike many discretionary programmes, it cannot simply be reduced by deciding to spend less next year. Debt must mature, refinance and service itself at prevailing market rates.

The underlying debt arithmetic can be summarised through one relationship. A country’s debt ratio is easier to stabilise when nominal economic growth exceeds the average effective interest rate paid on government debt. It becomes harder when interest rates exceed growth.

At debt equal to 100% of GDP, an interest-growth differential of positive 1 percentage point implies that a primary surplus of approximately 1% of GDP is needed merely to stabilise the debt ratio. At debt of 120% of GDP, that requirement rises to roughly 1.2%. Yet the US baseline contains a primary deficit, not a surplus.

This is why stronger productivity matters so much, but also why it is unlikely to be a complete solution.

CBO modelled an illustrative higher-growth scenario in which real GDP growth averaged approximately 2.6% during the coming decade. Under that stronger productivity path, cumulative deficits would fall materially and the 2036 debt ratio would be around 109% of GDP rather than 120%.

That would be a significant improvement.

It would still leave the debt burden substantially above current levels.

The entitlement timetable adds urgency.

The 2026 Social Security Trustees Report projected depletion of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance trust fund in 2032. At that point, continuing income would initially finance about 78% of scheduled benefits. The hypothetical combined Social Security trust funds were projected to deplete in 2034. Medicare’s Hospital Insurance fund was projected to deplete in 2033.

These dates do not mean Social Security or Medicare disappear. They mean the financing mismatch can no longer remain abstract.

Maintaining scheduled benefits eventually requires more financing. Refusing additional financing requires changes to benefits, eligibility or programme design.

Either way, the political system has to allocate the cost.

Who Ultimately Pays for Fiscal Adjustment?

There are only a limited number of ways to absorb a persistent fiscal imbalance.

Taxpayers can pay more.

Recipients of government spending can receive less.

Future taxpayers can inherit a larger debt burden.

Or holders of nominal financial claims can absorb part of the adjustment indirectly through inflation, financial repression or persistent negative real returns.

In practice, large fiscal consolidations usually involve some mixture.

The tax side is complicated because different taxes produce different behavioural responses.

Corporate taxation illustrates the point. A higher statutory corporate rate does not fall only on shareholders. Empirical research reviewed in the source report suggests that the burden can be distributed among business owners, employees and landowners through lower returns, wages, investment and asset values. State-level evidence estimates that firm owners may bear roughly half of the burden, workers around 35% to 40%, and landowners the remainder. Those estimates should not be mechanically applied to federal policy, but they demonstrate that “taxing corporations” is economically broader than the phrase implies.

Capital gains taxation presents another challenge.

Unlike wages, capital gains often involve substantial control over timing. Investors can defer realisations, harvest losses, gift assets, alter portfolio composition or change transaction timing. Those responses reduce the amount of revenue produced by any given increase in the statutory rate.

That does not mean higher capital-gains taxes necessarily lose revenue.

The research summarised in the dossier estimates that a five-percentage-point increase could still raise substantial revenue, while a previous CBO and Joint Committee on Taxation option found that a two-percentage-point rise in long-term capital-gains and qualified-dividend rates would reduce deficits by roughly $103 billion over a decade under the baseline then in force.

But the scale is revealing.

A tax reform that is highly material to the affected households can still be modest relative to a federal deficit measured in trillions of dollars.

That is why the proposition that America can solve its fiscal imbalance simply by taxing billionaires more aggressively is difficult to sustain arithmetically. Narrow taxes can generate meaningful revenue, but closing a structural gap of several percentage points of GDP would almost certainly require broader measures, major spending changes or both.

Wealth taxation creates similar trade-offs.

There are legitimate arguments for taxing accumulated wealth more directly, particularly where enormous fortunes can compound through unrealised appreciation for long periods. But there are also genuine valuation, liquidity, migration and administrative challenges.

Research reviewed in the report finds that wealth taxes can influence the location decisions of affluent taxpayers, although the aggregate economic consequences appear smaller than the migration statistics alone might suggest.

The central lesson is not that tax increases are futile.

It is that tax design matters.

A broad, credible fiscal consolidation designed to reduce structural deficits can have very different economic effects from a poorly structured tax increase that distorts investment while leaving the long-run fiscal position unchanged.

The Market Consequences Are Larger Than the Tax Bill

For investors, the most consequential transmission may not come through the tax code itself.

It may come through the discount rate.

Persistent deficits require persistent financing. That increases Treasury issuance, exposes the government to refinancing conditions and raises the possibility that investors eventually demand a larger term premium for holding long-duration US government debt.

The United States retains exceptional advantages.

The Treasury market is the deepest sovereign debt market in the world. The dollar remains the dominant reserve currency. Foreign investors continue to hold enormous quantities of US securities. And the government’s debt portfolio has a weighted-average maturity of roughly six years, which means higher market yields do not immediately reprice the entire outstanding debt stock.

Those advantages buy time.

They do not repeal arithmetic.

GAO put publicly held federal debt at roughly $31.3 trillion in April 2026. Once fully transmitted across the debt stock, a one-percentage-point increase in the average effective interest cost would correspond mechanically to approximately $313 billion in additional annual interest expense.

A two-percentage-point increase would be roughly $626 billion.

These are not one-year forecasts. Refinancing happens gradually. But they illustrate the scale of fiscal sensitivity once a very large debt stock interacts with higher borrowing costs.

For equities, the transmission is similarly multidimensional.

Higher corporate taxes can reduce after-tax earnings. Higher personal capital taxes can affect valuation and realisation incentives. Higher Treasury yields can compress equity multiples by raising the discount rate investors apply to future cash flows. Greater government borrowing can compete with private credit demand. Higher fiscal risk can influence currencies, inflation expectations and capital flows.

Yet credible fiscal consolidation could also reduce long-run Treasury supply and lower the risk premium embedded in sovereign borrowing costs.

That creates an important paradox.

A tax increase can be negative for after-tax corporate cash flow while simultaneously being positive for long-term valuation conditions if it materially improves fiscal credibility.

Likewise, a tax cut can support immediate cash flow but eventually contribute to higher discount rates if it substantially worsens the debt trajectory.

The market impact therefore depends on the package, not the label.

What Billionaire Families Have at Stake

For billionaire and ultra-high-net-worth families, fiscal adjustment operates through several channels at once.

The first is obvious: direct taxation.

Changes to ordinary income, capital gains, corporate profits, estates or unrealised wealth can alter after-tax returns and liquidity.

The second is less obvious: valuation.

A family whose wealth is concentrated in public equities, private businesses or long-duration assets can lose considerably more from a sustained increase in discount rates than from a modest increase in any one annual tax bill.

The third is liquidity.

Economic wealth and taxable cash are not the same thing.

A founder can be worth billions because of an illiquid company while holding comparatively little cash. Any tax system that moves taxation away from realised transactions and towards mark-to-market or recurring wealth assessments therefore creates a very different balance-sheet problem from a conventional tax on realised income.

The fourth is compounding.

One percentage point of recurring after-tax return difference becomes enormous across generations. The research illustrates this with a simple example. One dollar compounding at 6% annually for 30 years becomes approximately 5.74 dollars. At 5%, it becomes about 4.32 dollars.

The annual difference is only one percentage point. The terminal wealth difference is roughly one-third.

This is why wealthy families should think about taxation structurally rather than episodically.

Headline tax rates attract attention. Persistent tax drag, financing costs, trust leakage, currency mismatches, portfolio fees and inefficient realisation decisions can be equally important to multi-generational outcomes.

Estate policy is another critical channel.

The federal estate-tax basic exclusion is $15 million per individual in 2026. That threshold is extremely high relative to ordinary households but small relative to billionaire-scale balance sheets. For the largest families, succession planning therefore remains a question of business continuity, valuation, governance and liquidity even before any future tax reform is considered.

For private capital, the fiscal debate is consequently much broader than “will taxes rise?”

The larger issue is whether the underlying assumptions governing long-term ownership are changing.

Global Wealth Mobility Is Not as Simple as Moving Address

Whenever wealth taxation rises, discussions quickly turn to relocation.

But tax jurisdiction is more complicated than physical residence.

For US citizens and many US tax residents, simply moving to Dubai, Monaco, Switzerland or another low-tax jurisdiction does not automatically end US taxation. US citizens and resident aliens are generally taxed on worldwide income, while certain expatriates can become subject to the Section 877A mark-to-market exit-tax regime.

This distinction matters because global wealth is governed by multiple overlapping variables:

citizenship, personal tax residence, treaty residence, corporate residence, asset situs, custody location, beneficial ownership and the location of operating businesses.

They are not interchangeable.

A family can relocate personally while its company, investment structures or taxable connections remain substantially tied to the United States. A non-US family can hold American assets without becoming economically equivalent to a US citizen. A cross-border entrepreneur can change personal residence while leaving corporate tax obligations largely unchanged.

The attraction of jurisdictional optionality is nevertheless likely to increase.

When fiscal pressure rises, wealthy households place greater value on flexibility. That includes diversified custody, multiple legal jurisdictions, robust succession structures, currency flexibility and an ability to separate personal residence from the geography of investment exposure.

But mobility should not be confused with tax disappearance.

For sophisticated families, the relevant objective is durable after-tax ownership under clearly understood legal obligations, not a simplistic search for the lowest headline rate.

Three Possible Futures for American Fiscal Policy

The next decade does not require one predetermined outcome.

Three broad paths capture the most important possibilities.

1. Revenue-led consolidation

Washington could gradually increase revenue through some mixture of broader tax bases, higher selected rates, reduced tax expenditures and reforms affecting capital, businesses or consumption.

Such a path could create near-term drag in affected sectors and reduce some after-tax cash flows.

Its longer-term effect would depend on credibility. If higher revenues genuinely narrow primary deficits, reduce future Treasury issuance and stabilise debt, lower fiscal risk could partly offset the direct tax burden through more favourable financing and discount-rate conditions.

The crucial distinction would be between taxation that funds consolidation and taxation that simply finances additional spending.

2. Spending and productivity-led consolidation

A second path would place greater weight on slower entitlement growth, programme reform, improved government efficiency and stronger economic productivity.

This path may be politically attractive to those resistant to higher taxes, but it has its own distributional costs.

Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, defence and other major programmes are too large for meaningful spending reform to occur entirely through small discretionary cuts.

Productivity offers the least painful route, but CBO’s own higher-growth scenario suggests that even a material acceleration in growth would improve rather than fully repair the debt trajectory.

3. Persistent fiscal drift

The third possibility is continued delay.

Deficits remain high. Treasury issuance continues to expand. Net interest consumes a growing share of federal resources. Policymakers repeatedly postpone difficult decisions because capital markets continue to finance the government on tolerable terms.

This path can persist much longer than alarmist forecasts imply.

The dollar still represented 56.70% of reported global foreign-exchange reserves in the second quarter of 2026. Foreign holdings of US securities remain enormous. No single alternative market matches the depth, liquidity and institutional infrastructure of the US financial system.

But reserve-currency privilege should not be mistaken for immunity.

The risk is less likely to be a sudden sovereign crisis than a slow repricing of the world’s benchmark discount rate.

That is potentially more consequential for investors precisely because it can happen gradually.

Bancara Perspective: Fiscal Credibility and Enduring Wealth

The central conclusion is more nuanced than the claim that US taxes are too low.

America is demonstrably low-tax relative to most advanced economies.

America is not experiencing unusually weak federal revenue relative to its own post-war history.

What has changed more dramatically is the cost of the commitments that revenue must support.

That is why the coming fiscal adjustment cannot be viewed solely as a tax-policy debate.

It is a balance-sheet debate.

Higher taxes would alter corporate cash flows, capital-gains economics and intergenerational wealth transfer. Spending restraint would alter household benefits, government-linked industries and aggregate demand. Persistent deficits would influence Treasury supply, refinancing costs and discount rates. Faster productivity would improve almost every dimension of the equation, but is unlikely to remove the need for difficult choices entirely.

For global private wealth, the appropriate response is therefore not to predict the exact legislation Washington will pass.

It is to understand the exposures that matter under multiple outcomes.

Families with concentrated business wealth should understand how much liquidity exists independently of valuation. Investors with large unrealised gains should know how dependent their strategy is on indefinite deferral. Leveraged portfolios should be tested against materially higher risk-free rates. Cross-border families should distinguish citizenship, residence, custody and asset jurisdiction. Succession structures should be evaluated against several potential tax regimes rather than one assumption about permanence.

Most importantly, wealth should be measured on an after-tax and after-financing basis.

America’s greatest fiscal privilege is not an exemption from debt arithmetic. It is the depth of its capital markets, the global importance of its currency and the credibility that gives policymakers more time to respond.

Time, however, is not the same as resolution.

The investment question is therefore no longer whether America’s low-tax model has contributed to its extraordinary wealth-creation ecosystem. It clearly has.

The question is whether that model can continue to finance a government whose obligations and interest costs have grown much faster than the revenue system supporting them.

For sophisticated capital, that answer will influence far more than the tax bill.

It will shape the discount rate applied to American assets, the economics of corporate ownership, the value of liquidity, the architecture of succession and ultimately the durability of wealth itself.

Works Cited